Wednesday, December 22, 2010

Facebook for Finance

Facebook for Finance
08-Oct-2010
By Len Costa

Blogs, online networks and other social media web sites are creating new opportunities for investment research. Social media sites are supplementing, and in some cases supplanting, the traditional Wall Street information ecosystem that transmits sell-side investment research and stock calls to the buy side.

If information "wants to be free," as one half of the famous aphorism goes, somebody forgot to tell Wall Street. This fall a federal appeals court in New York will weigh in on a long-running and widely watched legal dispute pitting Barclays Capital, Bank of America Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley against Theflyonthewall.com, a New Jersey–based web site that publishes sell-side analyst recommendations before the market opens — and often before the firms can distribute their own research to clients. The firms contend this hurts their commission revenue. This past spring a lower court judge ordered Theflyonthewall.com to delay publication of the firms’ stock calls until one half hour after the opening of the New York Stock Exchange, among other restrictions. The web site countered with an appeal and won a temporary stay.

Even if the brokerage firms prevail in their battle against Theflyonthewall.com, winning the war to preserve the primacy of their investment research won’t be easy. Bolstered by the low cost of online publishing and the rising popularity of blogs, discussion forums and commenting, a growing number of niche web sites are creating opportunities for new forms of investment analysis to emerge — and for buy-side professionals, even those at rival firms, to collaborate and learn directly from one another. These social media web sites are supplementing, and in some cases supplanting, the traditional Wall Street information ecosystem that transmits sell-side investment research and stock calls to the buy side. The sites’ popularity has been fueled by the limitations and shrinking coverage universe of sell-side research and the failure of establishment experts — from Wall Street analysts and strategists to the credit ratings agencies to the financial news media — to call the credit crisis.

“The sell side can often be slow to twist and turn with where the market is going,” says David Jackson, a former Morgan Stanley technology analyst and the founder and CEO of Seeking Alpha, a leading investment blog backed by blue-chip venture capital firms Accel Partners, Benchmark Capital and DAG Ventures. But crowd-sourcing investment ideas, he says, has its benefits: Throughout the rise and crash in the price of oil in 2007 and 2008, the unraveling of the housing market and the implosion of Bear Stearns Cos. and Lehman Brothers Holdings, Jackson’s more than 3,000 handpicked contributors and vocal readers were “uncannily on topic in terms of what was driving the market — at a macro level and an individual stock level.”

In mid-August, as part of the U.S. Treasury Department’s ongoing outreach to the financial blogosphere, seven bloggers were invited to a private meeting with a small group of senior officials, including Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, to discuss financial reform. As four of the seven bloggers regularly contribute to Seeking Alpha, the meeting was a nod to the site’s growing influence.

Finance pros have taken notice. According to audience tracker Nielsen Co., Seeking Alpha, which launched in 2004, now attracts more financial professionals than any other major financial web site. The site recently hit 540,000 registered users, and its opinion and analysis pieces, which are free, are read by more than 2.8 million people a month. Nielsen data suggest that more than 385,000 of these individuals are professionals: money managers, sell-side analysts, investment bankers, financial advisers, business leaders, entrepreneurs and sophisticated retail investors. Morgan Stanley’s sell-side research, by comparison, goes out to roughly 250,000 institutional investors, though the firm’s reach is much broader when you factor in its retail network of 18,000 financial advisers and their clients.

“Blogging is absolutely democratizing the investment business,” says Barry Ritholtz, who is CEO and director of equity research at independent quant research firm FusionIQ, and who writes The Big Picture, a well-regarded blog about macro investing themes. A Wall Street veteran and the former chief market strategist at New York boutique investment bank Maxim Group, Ritholtz says that 20 years ago the typical Wall Street strategist had an economics degree, went to one of a half dozen leading MBA programs and came up through the ranks at a big firm: “You’re talking about members of the same club — similar schools, similar background, working at the big Wall Street firms, quoted in the major media.” But these days, he contends, “that model is totally broken.”

For every form of investing, to tweak Apple’s catchphrase, “there’s a blog for that.” Naked Capitalism, which specializes in financial and economic commentary, is overseen by Yves Smith, the nom de plume of a former Goldman, Sachs & Co. and McKinsey & Co. executive, and is widely read by hedge funds. Footnoted.org, launched by journalist Michelle Leder, reports on the things that companies try to bury in their Securities and Exchange Commission filings and was recently acquired by Morningstar. And Jeff Matthews Is Not Making This Up, written by te founder of Greenwich, Connecticut–based hedge fund RAM Partners, delivers blunt analysis of everything from the sources of revenue growth at Hewlett-Packard Co. under former CEO Mark Hurd to Wall Street’s earnings coverage.

The explosion in socially generated investment analysis is both a blessing and a curse, especially when you consider the volume of short messages containing financial content that are transmitted every day via Twitter, the microblogging service that is especially popular among active traders (see sidebar, opposite). To manage what traders might call the high “signal-to-noise ratio” of public web sites, at least three private online communities now cater specifically to professional investors: Value Investors Club and Distressed Debt Investors Club, which were founded in 2000 and 2009, respectively, and each cap their membership at 250 investors, who are anonymous to fellow users; and SumZero, which launched in 2008, combines user-generated investment research with social networking features and now boasts a membership of more than 4,000 buy-side analysts and portfolio managers.

All three sites are rivals of sorts but share some members. Generally speaking, they screen applicants based on the quality of a sample investment thesis and require members to post write-ups on securities and regularly rate other community members’ ideas. The sites may also offer incentives to encourage participation; Value Investors Club, for example, awards a weekly prize of $5,000 for the best idea.

SumZero is betting that scale, transparency and Facebook-style networking features will set the site apart from its two smaller rivals. “The dynamic is that the bigger the idea database gets, the more compelling it becomes to contribute to,” says co-founder and CEO Divya Narendra, a 28-year-old former analyst at Boston-based hedge fund Sowood Capital Management who is running the site while pursuing law and business degrees at Northwestern University.

Networks are something that Narendra has spent a lot of time thinking about. As an undergraduate at Harvard University, he co-founded social network ConnectU, and he remains locked in a long-running legal battle with Facebook and its co-founder Mark Zuckerberg, a Harvard classmate whom Narendra accuses of stealing his idea. SumZero’s name and tagline, “The opposite of zero sum,” suggest a Facebook-like zeitgeist. It’s a cheeky riff on the idea — which seems out of place in the cutthroat world of money management — that investors can create value for one another by openly collaborating and sharing ideas.

And they are. James Kilroy, a portfolio manager at Gainesville, Georgia–based Willis Investment Counsel, which oversees about $1 billion in institutional and high-net-worth assets, joined SumZero when it was a third of its current size. He says that he often posts a detailed investment thesis to the site after completing his research and building a position. His goal is to stress-test his ideas — “I want to understand how I can be wrong,” he says — and to share them with an influential community that is prepared to act on a persuasive argument.

“You want to be early and first,” explains Kilroy, a former Bear Stearns analyst who covered multi-industrials, “but ultimately you need other investors to share your point of view for the stock to go up.” Kilroy likes the fact that SumZero members must disclose whom they work for and the type of funds they manage. “It forces you to a higher level of accountability,” he adds.

Access to contrarian investment thinking is also a key driver of investor interest in these social media sites. Jackson credits Seeking Alpha’s success to the diversity of viewpoints expressed by the site’s writers and commentators, who create a wide-angle view of a stock that he says is unmatched by traditional Wall Street research. SumZero’s Narendra agrees. “Somebody might put up a thesis [on SumZero] where a stock trades at $2 and the target is $10,” he says. “That’s the kind of stuff that the investment community needs — a divergence of viewpoints, as opposed to herd thinking.”

Still, investors must proceed with caution. In a 2007 study of 340 buy and 160 sell recommendations posted on Seeking Alpha, Veljko Fotak, a Ph.D. student in finance at the University of Oklahoma, found that the stock picks exhibited some value and market impact, as measured by returns in the 20 trading days after publication, but that the quality of the investment advice varied. He found scant evidence of any factors that could predict the quality of a blogger’s recommendations.

Size may be the enemy of the good. Wesley Gray, an assistant professor of finance at Drexel University in Philadelphia and a co-founder of Empirical Finance, a recently seeded $50 million quantitative hedge fund, has studied the investment write-ups posted to Value Investors Club, whose founders, Joel Greenblatt and John Petry — longtime partners at New York hedge fund firm Gotham Capital — strictly enforce the 250-member cap. Gray’s analysis, which formed the basis of his Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, found that stocks recommended on the site delivered an average one-year buy-and-hold return of 9.52 percentage points above the predicted return, after controlling for risk. Gray and his colleagues performed a similar, unpublished analysis of recommendations on the SumZero web site, which has a much larger user base and a shorter track record, and found no statistical evidence that the ideas posted there were, on average, market-beating.

That comes as no surprise to the Value Investors Club founders, who admit just one in 15 applicants. “If every member of the buy side joins SumZero, over time you’re going to have the aggregate return of the market,” says Petry.
Blogs, online communities and crowd-sourcing platforms like Twitter may hold promise for investors, but their reach is still limited, especially among more-seasoned professionals. “Most portfolio managers over 35 are ignoring this stuff,” says Steven Goldstein, co-founder and CEO of Alacra, a New York–based content aggregator that helps investment firms track information published on blogs, social media sites and other online sources.

Tapping into the right networks can be a Herculean task. “Yes, there is a proliferation of information and a lot of debates happening on social networking sites, but I think if anything it obfuscates the issues,” says Barry Hurewitz, chief operating officer of investment research at Morgan Stanley. He contends that good sell-side analysts, thanks to their own professional networks, are better equipped to define the debate and understand market expectations. “They tend to have the conversations with investors that matter the most,” says Hurewitz.

The proponents of online communities and social networking have no delusions of grandeur, but they are firm in their belief that these new online tools will ultimately change the way investors conduct research and vet new ideas. “I don’t want to sound ridiculous,” says SumZero’s Narendra, who positions his site as an alternative source of information that complements existing sources, such as sell-side research, 10-Ks and investors’ own proprietary models. Still, the entrepreneur can’t help but ponder the possibilities. “If we get to the stage where there are 10,000 to 20,000 buy-side analysts all in one community,” he says, “I think that’s really, really powerful.”

THE FACT THAT professional money managers share investment ideas online is perplexing to academic economists. After all, in an efficient and competitive market, money managers should be inclined to keep valuable insights private so that they can exploit the information advantage to outperform their rivals and attract greater sums of investment capital.

In practice, though, sharing has long been one of the most important ways that fund managers discover new investment ideas. Private “idea” dinners and gatherings like the twice-annual Value Investing Congress, launched by Whitney Tilson and John Schwartz, have long been a staple of the business. In a 1988 academic paper, written back when social networking meant working the cocktail party circuit rather than friending somebody on Facebook, Yale University economist Robert Shiller and then–Harvard economist John Pound found that roughly 53 percent of the institutional investors they surveyed attributed their initial interest in a stock to another investment professional. When the inquiry was limited to a small sample of stocks that had experienced rapid price increases, 75 percent of the investors traced the origins of their ideas to fellow fund managers.

Sharing good ideas with competitors, it turns out, is an entirely rational undertaking. Drexel’s Gray cites three reasons: the collaboration argument (originally put forward by another academic, Harvard economist Jeremy Stein), which holds that managers will share information if doing so provides access to constructive feedback; the diversification argument, which holds that sharing is rational when it gives managers access to a wider pool of high-quality ideas; and the awareness argument, known more pejoratively as “talking your book,” in which a manager profits by persuading other investors to buy, thus bidding up the price.

The speed and scope of information sharing among investment professionals got a big boost in the late 1990s with the rapid adoption of instant messaging on Wall Street. With IM, brokers and traders — much like the teenagers who popularized the technology — found that they could share information with multiple individuals simultaneously and that sending an IM was more real-time than e-mail and more convenient than the telephone.

Sensing an opportunity, Reuters and Bloomberg introduced their own instant messaging platforms in 2002 and 2003, respectively, marking an important turning point. Unlike most consumer IM platforms at the time, both companies offered investment firms security, auditing and privacy controls, helping compliance officers get comfortable with the technology amid growing scrutiny by the SEC and other regulators that oversee brokerage firms.

As Reuters and Bloomberg terminals became ubiquitous in the investment business, they emerged as linchpins in what might be deemed Wall Street’s formal network for the distribution of research and stock calls to the buy side. Today, once an analyst releases a research report, it is typically published to the firm’s password-protected web site for clients and distributed simultaneously to entitled customers via Thomson Reuters (as the company is now known), Bloomberg or other third-party distributors, such as Capital IQ. Brokers and traders also e-mail research to clients, disseminate the substance via IM and host private conference calls or webcasts to discuss the investment opinions.

Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg are themselves working to build on strengths in instant messaging to create new opportunities for investment professionals to share and collaborate online — but in a way that affords firms ample control over who can see their content and how their employees share research and other proprietary information. Both companies’ flagship data products allows users to create profiles, follow updates from individual users and share charts and data, along with comments. “Bloomberg built systems to meet our customers’ networking needs before the concept of social media even existed,” says Jean-Paul Zammitt, Bloomberg’s head of core terminal products and services.

Even a Wall Street lawyer could love this kind of networking: As Eran Barak, Thomson Reuters’s global head of community strategy, puts it, the goal is to “bring the power of community and collaboration into financial professionals’ work flow,” while giving IT departments and compliance officers “all the tools to be compliant with regulation and perform risk management.”

Outside of this formal distribution network, socially generated investment opinion is for now less heavily regulated, but potentially very lucrative, for those who can tap into the right source. Value Investors Club, the most exclusive of the online venues aimed at pros, is seen as a particularly fertile source of high-quality ideas. In early May, for example, user “cxix” recommended shares of NBTY, the world’s largest maker of vitamins and supplements, then trading at $39 a share. The company, cxix wrote, was “a better business than it’s generally given credit for” and prone to “blow-ups” — such as the one in the previous week, when shares fell 20 percent intraday — because management “doesn’t play the earnings guidance/smoothing game.” With the stock trading at $54 in mid-September, investors who bought on the dip were up nearly 40 percent.

“When you submit a good idea to Value Investors Club or SumZero, others get on board,” says Alan Axelrod, a member of both sites and a former managing director at Ziff Brothers Investments, who now oversees $50 million in separately managed long-short domestic equity accounts. “You can immediately see some volume change plus the stock going up on a long you might suggest or down on a short.”

THERE is NO DOUBT that invest ment recommendations posted to social networks, however exclusive they may be, can be subject to biases. The 2007 paper by Fotak of the University of Oklahoma found that the stock picks from bloggers on Seeking Alpha tended to focus on large-cap names with recent abnormal returns and trading volumes. Long picks were consistent with contrarian strategies, he found, while shorts reflected momentum strategies.

Conversely, stock picks posted to Value Investors Club and SumZero are more likely to be small-cap stocks or special-situations opportunities, according to Drexel’s Gray. He noted in his Ph.D. thesis that the median market cap of long ideas, which make up the vast majority of recommendations on both sites, was $393 million for Value Investors Club and $559 million for SumZero. Most users of both sites are themselves employed by small and midsize firms. Based on an analysis of SumZero’s membership, Gray found evidence that larger fund managers were less willing to share new ideas than smaller managers were. (His interest isn’t just academic: Gray’s hedge fund trades in part on quantitative models that analyze the flow of information through social networks like SumZero and Value Investors Club.)

Apart from discovering and vetting new investment ideas, these specialized social media sites — the ones that don’t permit anonymity, at least — also provide crucial networking opportunities. Narendra says that SumZero is in many ways an extension of the information provided by services like Bloomberg. He points out that a Bloomberg terminal can be used to find out the names of firms that are 5 percent holders of a company’s stock, but not the names of the analysts at those firms who actually cover the company. On SumZero, however, users can search for a 5 percent holder and find out which of its analysts is covering the company. Users can also figure out who they know in common, whether they both used to work at Goldman Sachs or even whether they attended the same business school. “We’ve taken elements from social networking and [online encyclopedia] Wikipedia and applied them to the buy side in a way that nobody really has in the past,” says Narendra.

Over time, social networking may reduce the advantage that more-sophisticated asset managers with deeper pockets enjoy over smaller firms. “You’re gaining an extension of your own staff of smart people to render an opinion,” says money manager Axelrod. Although he generally prefers anonymity when connecting with peers online, he hasn’t hesitated to take advantage of the networking opportunities afforded by SumZero, using the site to identify fellow investors with whom to strategize. “It provides avenues for what social media is all about: relationships,” says Axelrod. “Not frivolous relationships but very valuable points of access.”

Alexander Rubalcava, founder of Los Angeles–based wealth management firm Rubalcava Capital Management, agrees. He recently posted on SumZero an analysis of offshore oil exploration and production company ATP Oil & Gas Corp., which has substantial operations in the Gulf of Mexico. As the BP oil spill dragged on, the web site “helped me keep track of all the changes proposed by the government,” says Rubalcava, a former analyst at Santa Monica, California–based venture capital firm Anthem Venture Partners. “Keeping up with that was beyond any one firm, but a lot of people were exchanging their findings on SumZero.”

The market for online investment opinion is helping some firms reach new clients. Chicago-based independent equity research firm Applied Finance Group, which typically serves institutional investors and large bank trust departments, publishes a daily investment thesis on a proprietary blog called Value Expectations and regularly contributes ideas and analysis to Seeking Alpha. Co-founder Rafael Resendes says the exposure has helped introduce his firm to registered investment advisers and brokerage teams that haven’t typically been big buyers of independent research. “Who knows how this will change the client landscape,” he says.

The Big Picture’s Ritholtz also attributes business wins to his blog. His firm, Fusion IQ, runs an asset management business that has attracted more than $300 million in assets, primarily through word-of-mouth referrals. “I suspect there’s a comfort level thanks to my blog,” says Ritholtz. “It makes the process of someone validating you that much easier.”
Networking and information exchange may be especially valuable in niche areas of the market. A case in point is Distressed Debt Investors Club, the brainchild of a credit analyst who goes by the handle “Hunter” and has eight years of experience on the buy side. Hunter, who declines to reveal his real name or the name of his employer, says that about three quarters of the roughly 200 investment ideas on the web site are distressed-debt and event-driven plays, with the remainder split between equity and special-situations opportunities.

“A lot of people on the site have either formal credit training or a leveraged finance background, so people understand the bankruptcy and restructuring process,” explains Hunter, who says his site marries the best of Value Investors Club and SumZero. (He is a member of both.) “On other sites or in sell-side reports, you might not have people well versed enough to understand the implications of, say, a fraudulent conveyance ruling.”

Still, money managers trolling for new investment ideas must proceed with caution. Academic studies of retail investors have found strong evidence that stock message boards lead to confirmation bias. Studies of professional investors’ offline behavior suggest that they are prone to the same temptations. With the balkanization of online information sources and the rise of the number of networking sites for professionals, myopia is a hazard. “You run the risk of reading just the people who agree with you,” says Ritholtz.

Conflicts of interest are another danger. Seeking Alpha differentiates itself with a contributor policy that requires its bloggers, who range from hobbyist investors to professionals, to provide the site’s editors with their real names for verification purposes, even if they blog anonymously, and to disclose positions in the securities they write about. Still, compliance with the policy is not policed by the site and thus depends on contributors acting in good faith.

The founders of private buy-side communities that permit anonymity say that they too know everyone’s identity, even if fellow users don’t, and that their sophisticated, highly vetted user bases assume that people are writing about positions they already own. “It’s preselected for people who will see through pump-and-dump,” says Value Investors Club’s Greenblatt.

Will these nascent social networking sites for financiers flourish — or will they remain a pursuit for just a narrow slice of the investment community? There are challenges to growth. For starters, regulators and compliance departments alike are still trying to figure out how to adapt existing rules on disclosure, supervision and recordkeeping to the unruly world of social media communications. Many firms are ordering employees to steer clear, and in some cases they are simply blocking social media sites from office computers.

“The new technology keeps morphing,” says Margaret Paradis, a partner in the investment fund and asset management practice at law firm Baker & McKenzie in New York. “That’s the challenge on the regulatory side.”

Making money is another hurdle. Some sites, like Value Investors Club, will no doubt continue to be run as quiet side projects for a select few. But other sites, such as Seeking Alpha and SumZero, aim to become profitable businesses. Seeking Alpha relies primarily on advertising, but in October the site will launch a platform featuring more than 20 applications for stock and exchange-traded-fund research as well as screening and charting tools, says CEO Jackson. SumZero is contemplating a different model. Rather than pursuing advertising, Narendra and his partners are considering strategies for selling or licensing to third parties the investment selections and recommendations that are featured on the site.

Back on Wall Street, many of the major brokerage firms say they aren’t yet ready to discuss how they might deploy social media tools to extend the reach of their investment research. But at least one firm is taking a page from the digital media playbook. In August, Morgan Stanley became the first Wall Street firm to launch iPad and iPhone apps allowing institutional clients to search and browse its research. According to research COO Hurewitz, the firm has already begun streaming research presentations on video.

And in a world awash in information, Morgan Stanley is helping its analysts validate their investment theses by leveraging a three-year-old internal custom research group called AlphaWise, which uses tools like quantitative market research and data mining to uncover primary evidence on any topic, from casual dining trends in the U.S. to equity issuance in India.

By strengthening its research with proprietary data sources and delivering the content through new digital channels, such as apps that enable the firm to control access with a log-in, these initiatives are consistent with the firm’s protective stance in its case against Theflyonthewall.com, but at odds with the open, collaborative and freewheeling nature of the social web. Whether these two approaches to creating professional-quality investment opinion can coexist in the information age, or whether they will ultimately converge as they have in other industries, remains to be seen.

Len Costa is the director of innovation and emerging media at CFA Institute, a global association of investment professionals.

Wednesday, February 17, 2010

The Greek Problem!

The Greek Problem!
By Macrostrategy.com

The biggest issue in the global financial market at this time is whether or not Greece is going to default on its sovereign debt. That depends on Germany. Germans are not keen on bailing out the profligate Greeks but German and Euro establishment may not have much choice. We'll see how the events unfold but the Greek 5-year CDS spread (355bp) implies 28% default probability over that period. The last time a sovereign defaulted was in 2002 when Argentina abrogated its obligations to international bondholders. How Greece and Europe deal with the problem will impact the Euro and the dollar. So, what exactly is the Greek's debt problem? Why is it become so now?

Greek debt became the headline issues late last year when the finance minister announced that the country's deficit to GDP ratio for 2009 would be 12.7% instead of 6.0% originally forecast. This raised alarm bells amongst international investors because Greece needs to roll-over Euro 16 billion of its debt in April/May. As the focus on Greek finance intensified more nefarious activities started to come to light. Specifically, Greece was accused of consistently under-reporting its debt to the Eurostat, the European statistical agency by using complex derivative transactions. In actuality this was an open secret; in fact, an Italian academic Gustavo Piga wrote a paper on this exact topic back in 2002.

The genesis of the problem goes back to 2001 when Greece joined the Euro. In lieu of its entry, it had to abide by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) established in 1996. SGP set two important targets for member states: a debt to GDP ratio of less than 60% and a deficit to GDP ratio of less than 3%. At the time of entry, Greece was within the deficit limits but its debt was over 100%. In 2002, the European Commission pressured Greece to reduce its debt not just interest payments on those debt. In order to comply, Greece used cross-currency swaps in very innovative ways.

A cross-currency swap involves the exchange of payments denominated in one currency for payments denominated in another over fixed time period. Payments are based on a notional principal amount the value of which is fixed in exchange rate terms at the swap's inception. Like any derivatives, cross-currency swap can be used either as a hedging instrument (against exchange rate fluctuations) or as a speculative instrument (to bet on movements in currencies and yield curves). Cross-currency swaps do not change the size of debt (principal) at the beginning of the contract. At the end of the contract, debt value can change or not change based on nature of the contract. Swaps do alter periodic interest payments depending on the relative movements of exchange rates and interest rates in reference countries.

Swaps do not reduce the size of debt, just the costs of borrowing. So how were Greeks able to reduce debt using cross-currency swaps? The simple answer is because the Eurostat accountants allowed them to. ESA95, the accounting standards for government debt and deficit allowed "up-front swap payment" to reduce debt because it did not take into account the corresponding increase in payment at the end of the contract. Greece and Goldman Sachs took advantage of this accounting loophole to comply with EC's demands.

Starting 2002, Greece and Goldman Sachs entered into series of cross-currency swaps exchanging Greek's dollar-denominated and Yen-denominated debt for Euro-denominated debt. The transactions totaled about US$ 10 billion with tenor (maturity) of 15 to 20 years. Instead of using spot Euro/US$ and Euro/Yen exchange rates to swap debt, they used "off-market" rates whereby the reference Euro rates were lower than spot rates. This in effect was equivalent to one-time foreign exchange gains for Greece causing Goldman Sachs to make US$1 billion up-front payment followed by higher than otherwise periodic interest payments. As per ESA95, Greeks reported this up-front payment as a reduction in debt. The currency gain was going to reverse and Greeks were expected to payback Goldman Sachs at the end of the contract but they did not have to report that to the Eurostat. Goldman Sachs on the other hand hedged its exposure to the Greek transaction by taking off-setting positions with Frankfurt-based Deutsche Pfandbriefe Bank.

The bottom line is that Greece will not be able to roll-over its debt without some kind of international guarantee but what form that takes and who leads it (Germany or IMF) if at all is an open question. Lets see how this plays out!

Reference
Bank of America, January 2007. Introduction to Cross Currency Swaps
Bernard Connolly and John Whittaker. What will happen to the euro? (6-Nov-2002)
BMO Capital Markets. Cross Currency Swaps
Economist. Financial WMD? (22-Jan-04)
Gustavo Piga. Do Governments Use Financial Derivatives Appropriately? Evidence from Sovereign Borrowers in Developed Economies, International Finance, Vol 4 # 2 (16 Dec 2002)
Nick Dunbar, Risk Magazine. Revealed: Goldman Sachs’ mega-deal for Greece (1-Jul-03)
Vishal_Damor. Greece Soverign Debt Crisis, The Way Forward, if Any! (11-Feb-10)
Wolfgang Reuter. Greek Debt Threatens the Euro, Spiegel (8-Dec-09)

Tuesday, February 16, 2010

2003 Risk Magazine Article Exposes Greeks-Goldman Swaps

Revealed: Goldman Sachs’ mega-deal for Greece
Risk magazine, 01-Jul-2003
By Nick Dunbar

With the help of Goldman Sachs, Greece has been using giant swaps deals to ensure its national debt ratios meet EU targets. But these deals are likely to prove controversial. By Nicholas Dunbar

Ever since the deficit and debt rules for eurozone member states were drawn up in the early 1990s, there have been persistent rumours and allegations that governments have used derivatives to get around them. For some time, economists have argued that the combination of strict external targets with considerable local autonomy in sovereign debt management almost inevitably leads high-deficit countries towards derivatives.

It is now widely known that since 1996, Italy’s Treasury has regularly used swaps transactions to optically reduce its publicly reported debt and deficit ratios. Such trades remain controversial, and were the subject of fierce debate in late 2001, when Italian academic Gustavo Piga published a paper accusing eurozone countries of ‘window dressing’ their public accounts using derivatives (Risk January 2002, page 17).

Now, Italy has been joined by the Hellenic Republic of Greece, as evidence emerges of a remarkable deal between the public debt division of Greece’s finance ministry and the investment bank Goldman Sachs. The deal is not only likely to reopen an old debate on public accounting for derivatives, but also sheds light on the way banks charge clients for taking credit and market risk exposure.

Intended to rein in fiscal profligacy among aspiring eurozone entrants, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) – established in 1996 – sets two important targets for member states: a debt/GDP ratio of less than 60% and a deficit/GDP ratio of less than 3%. Of the two, the second is considered more important. Countries that show persistent breaches of the 3% target are liable to pay heavy fines to Brussels of up to 0.5% of GDP under the so-called Excessive Deficit Programme (EDP). Performing the key regulatory role of determining whether the targets have been met is the European Statistical Office (Eurostat).

Greece, which joined the single currency in early 2001, resembles mid-1990s Italy in certain respects. Until recently it was a country of high deficits and high inflation, and for this reason did not bother joining the first wave of eurozone countries in 1998. In the run-up to joining the eurozone, Greek inflation and budget deficits fell sharply, and GDP grew as the incumbent socialist government pursued a policy of UK-style public-sector reform. However, like Italy, Greece’s debt/GDP ratio has remained high, at over 100%, and as a result its interest costs are the highest in the eurozone.

Public statement

In November 2001, the Greek finance ministry’s public debt division made a public statement about its debt management strategy. It acknowledged that its debt was a ‘critical macroeconomic parameter’, and pledged to reduce debt servicing costs by means that included ‘the extensive use of derivatives’. Apparently, this was not enough for Brussels. In February 2002, the European Commission pointed out future deficit forecasts by Greece relied ‘primarily’ on achieving reductions in interest costs. It called for Greece to reduce its ‘very high’ debt ratio, and to provide ‘more detailed information on financial operations’.

Although Greece’s public debt division points out that it uses 18 derivatives counterparties, there is no doubt that the division, which is headed by Christopher Sardelis, has a particularly close relationship with Goldman Sachs. Indeed, the account has been handled personally at Goldman Sachs by Antigone Loudiadis, the London-based European head of sales for the firm’s fixed-income, currencies and commodities unit. Highly respected by other dealers, Loudiadis has enjoyed a successful career at Goldman, joining the firm’s partnership committee and attaining her present position in 2000. According to sources, by early 2002, Loudiadis and her team put together a deal aimed at alleviating Greece’s problem of debt ratios and high interest costs.

The transactions agreed between the Greek public debt division and Goldman Sachs involved cross-currency swaps linked to Greece’s outstanding yen and dollar debt. Cross-currency swaps were among the earliest over-the-counter derivatives contracts to be traded, and have a perfectly routine purpose in debt management, namely to transform the currency of an obligation.

For example, an issuer with foreign fixed-rate debt might choose to lock in a favourable exchange rate move. To do this, it could swap a stream of fixed domestic currency payments for a stream of foreign currency ones, referenced to the notional of the debt using the prevailing spot foreign exchange rate, with an exchange of the two notionals at maturity. Because they are transacted at spot exchange rates, cross-currency swaps of this type have zero present value at inception, although the net value (and credit exposure of either counterparty) may subsequently fluctuate.

However, according to sources, the cross-currency swaps transacted by Goldman for Greece’s public debt division were ‘off-market’ – the spot exchange rate was not used for re-denominating the notional of the foreign currency debt. Instead, a weaker level of euro versus dollar or yen was used in the contracts, resulting in a mismatch between the domestic and foreign currency swap notionals. The effect of this was to create an upfront payment by Goldman to Greece at inception, and an increased stream of interest payments to Greece during the lifetime of the swap. Goldman would recoup these non-standard cashflows at maturity, receiving a large ‘balloon’ cash payment from Greece.

Since neither Goldman nor Greece will comment on the deal, much of the details remain vague. It is not clear which exchange rates were used in the actual contracts. Under the terms of a similar ‘off-market’ deal transacted by Italy in 1997, the exchange rates prevailing at the time of the underlying bond issue were used, which would have made sense in the case of Greece since the deal happened after a period of euro strengthening against the yen and dollar.

Although the overall deal is believed to have consisted of three or four individual transactions or tranches, according to sources, the total cross-currency swap notional was approximately $10 billion, with tenors ranging from 15 to 20 years. While the size of upfront payment to Greece’s public debt division is not clear, it seems the total credit risk incurred by Goldman Sachs was roughly $1 billion. Effectively, Goldman Sachs was extending a long-dated illiquid loan to its client.

Goldman Sachs is known for its conservative approach to credit risk, and chose to hedge its exposure to Greece by immediately placing the risk with a well-known investor in sovereign credit: Frankfurt-based Deutsche Pfandbriefe Bank (Depfa). According to sources, Depfa entered into a credit default swap with Goldman Sachs, selling $1 billion of protection on Greece for up to 20 years. Depfa declined to comment.

Total charge

Details have also emerged of the way Greece’s public debt division was charged for the transaction. According to market sources, the total charge was approximately $200 million. This charge can be broken down into several components. First, Greece was charged for the credit risk in the transaction. Long-dated Greek government bonds were trading at a spread of 30 basis points in 2002. A billion-dollar investment in such bonds, purchased in asset swap form and held for 20 years, would yield about $60 million. According to Risk’s sources, Depfa demanded a substantial premium for taking on what was in effect an illiquid, privately placed loan.

Second, Greece paid a principal risk charge to Goldman Sachs for its market risk exposure. Although standard euro/dollar and euro/yen cross-currency swaps are highly liquid instruments that trade at tight bid-offer spreads in the interbank market, such large, off-market transactions cannot be hedged in this market without significantly moving the price against the dealer. Goldman Sachs may have hedged some of the risk using futures, forwards and interest rate swaps, while retaining substantial cross-currency and interest rate basis risks in its portfolio. Of course, the ultimate profit and loss experienced by Goldman Sachs on the transactions remains unknown.

Equally murky is the exact effect of Goldman Sachs’ transactions on Greece’s publicly reported national accounts. Since the deficit was a comfortable 1.2% of GDP in 2002, it is more likely that the cashflows were either used to help lower the debt/GDP ratio from 107% in 2001, to 104.9% in 2002 (by funding buybacks) or to lower interest payments from 7.4% in 2001 to 6.4% in 2002. But why did the large negative market value of the swaps not appear on the liability side of Greece’s balance sheet?

The answer can be found in ESA95, a 243-page manual on government deficit and debt accounting, published by the European Commission and Eurostat in 2002. As revealed by Piga, the drafting of ESA95’s section on derivatives was the subject of fierce arguments between the government statisticians and debt managers of certain eurozone countries.

The statisticians wanted derivatives-related cashflows to be treated as financial transactions, with no effect on deficit or interest costs, and with the derivatives’ current market value stated as an asset or liability. The debt managers opposed this, insisting on having the freedom to use derivatives to adjust deficit ratios. The published version of ESA95 reflects the victory of the debt managers in this argument with a series of last-minute amendments.

In particular, ESA95 states in a page-long ‘clarification’ that ‘streams of interest payments under swaps agreements will continue… having an impact on general government net borrowing/net lending’. In other words, upfront swap payments – which Eurostat classifies as interest – can reduce debt, without the corresponding negative market value of the swap increasing it. According to ESA95, the clarification only covers ‘currency swaps based on existing liabilities’.

Legitimate transaction

There is no doubt that Goldman Sachs’ deal with Greece was a completely legitimate transaction under Eurostat rules. Moreover, both Goldman Sachs and Greece’s public debt division are following a path well trodden by other European sovereigns and derivatives dealers. However, like many accounting-driven derivatives transactions, such deals are bound to create discomfort among those who like accounts to reflect economic reality. For example, the Greece-Goldman deal may be of interest to credit rating agency Standard & Poor’s, which upgraded Greece’s long-term debt from A to A+ in June 2003.

Among other derivatives dealers, the deal is bound to create envy at Goldman Sachs’ skill in solving the risk management needs of such an important client. As long as the current Eurostat rules do not change, the use of derivatives in deficit and debt management by eurozone sovereigns is likely to flourish. The planned expansion of the eurozone to include 15 east European countries may lead to especially rich pickings for dealers able to seize such opportunities.