Why hard assets are not easy to find

Why hard assets are not easy to find
By Raghuram Rajan
Financial Times, Feb 12 2007

Signs of extremely benign financing conditions are plentiful, ranging from low long-term interest rates to historically narrow credit spreads on risky assets. Many observers call this a liquidity glut, thereby implicating central banks and their accommodative policies. But in my view, these conditions may primarily be driven by a global shortage of hard assets.

My argument relies on two global ingredients. The first is that, in spite of substantial worldwide income growth, if anything there has been an increase in the desire to save out of it. In emerging markets where income growth is rapid, savings increase. Household consumption in developing countries takes time to catch up with higher incomes – either because households take time to be confident that the increase is permanent or because credit constraints prevent them from borrowing to consume against future incomes.

Also, emerging market governments, including oil producers, not only have higher revenues but have become more careful about expenditure, given past experiences with deficits.

But perhaps most intriguing is the increase in corporate savings, especially in industrial countries. Profitable corporations, made more profitable by lower taxes and interest rates, retain earnings rather than hand them back as dividends to shareholders.

This is where we come to the second ingredient. Nominal corporate investment in hard assets – such as inventories, property, plant and equipment – has been restrained, especially relative to the quantities that might be warranted by the tremendous productivity growth of the past few years. Instead, more corporate savings have been invested in financial assets.

A number of possible explanations exist. Some sectors may have invested too much during the technology boom and be still working it off. A competitive need to improve inventory management and, more generally, utilisation of capital may also be at work. The cost of capital goods has fallen, which implies that less nominal investment is needed to achieve the same level of real investment. Furthermore, the nature of required investment may be changing, especially in industrial countries – from physical capital to human capital.

Perhaps the key factor, though, in holding back investment in hard assets may be economic uncertainty – ranging from corporate takeover threats to the increasing cost-competitiveness of emerging markets. Indeed, it makes less and less sense for corporations in industrial countries to make large domestic investments in the manufacturing sector. But as they look to invest in non-industrial countries, they become subject to the uncertainties of policy there. Not only do they have to worry about whether China is a better place to invest than Vietnam but also whether it will continue to be better 10 years from now. No wonder many corporations are focused on trying to improve the efficiency of their existing capital and stock of knowledge.

The mismatch between unabated global desired savings and lower realised investment has led to a financing glut, particularly pronounced in debt markets. With subdued investment in hard assets, there are fewer assets that can be used as collateral on which to base corporate debt. Given that a substantial portion of the world’s desired savings are put to work by central banks and financial institutions, many of which have statutory requirements (or matching considerations) to buy debt, we have many buyers for debt but too few debt instruments being issued.

Consider some implications. First, given that markets are integrated, the glut has spilt over into areas such as property and pushed prices higher. Especially affected have been the most illiquid markets and assets that have a debt-like character, such as utilities, which pay a steady dividend. Some of these markets are frothy, given the long-term prognosis for the savings-investment balance.

Second, while corporations may have learnt to be cautious through recent experience, builders and households have not faced adversity for some time and may have a greater propensity to over-invest. Third, sophisticated financial systems such as that of the US, have been particularly adept at creating instruments the market wants. This has helped the smooth financing of the US current account deficit and may be partly a cause of the deficit.

Finally, easy financing conditions the world over are not primarily because of the accommodative policy followed by the Group of Three central banks in recent years, though clearly monetary policy can add or subtract at the margin by affecting liquidity conditions and carry trades.

What is hard to forecast is how financing conditions will change. As capacity constraints tighten and as the policy environment in emerging markets becomes more clear, more investment will naturally be undertaken, reducing the financing imbalance and pushing up long-term interest rates. If this happens smoothly, the froth in exchange and asset markets will dissipate without much disruption. If long-term rates move more rapidly, for instance because of an inflation scare, the ride could be far more volatile.

The writer is a professor of finance at the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago